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ABSTRACT 
The domain-specific evaluative approach to risk-taking propensity allows people to differentiate 
situations in which they will approach risk-related decisions from situations in which they will 
avoid them. The Domain-Specific Risk-Taking Scale (DOSPERT) is the most widely used 
measure of such evaluations. The current study of the DOSPERT tests alternatives to the 
assumed five-domain structure, explores associations between the DOSPERT and alternative 
risk-taking measures, and tests the incremental validity of the DOSPERT in predicting both self-
reported risky behavior and risky behavior in the lab. Analyses show that the DOSPERT would 
benefit from a six-factor structure rather than five factors, the DOSPERT domains are weakly 
correlated with the majority of alternative risk-taking propensity measures, and the DOSPERT 
can predict variance in certain self-reported risky behaviors, but not risky behaviors in the lab, 
after accounting for alternative measures. 
Key words: Risk-taking, validity, measurement, personality 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Decisions to take or avoid risks influence behavior in a wide variety of domains, ranging 
from the relatively mundane (e.g., buying a lottery ticket, unhealthy food choices) to impactful 
(e.g., changing careers, relationship decisions, buying a home). Because individuals are 
frequently required to make such decisions, researchers have examined variables that might 
reflect the general tendency to favor an action with an extremely profitable, but unlikely, or an 
extremely aversive outcome over an alternative action with a less extreme but more likely 
outcome (Derntl, Pintzinger, Kryspin-Exner, & Schöpf, 2014) (hereafter referred to as “risk-
taking propensity”). In economics, risk-taking propensity can partially explain behaviors like 
gambling preferences, stock management, and debt accrual (Alm, McClelland, & Schultze, 1992; 
Dew & Xiao, 2011; Dislich, Zinkernagel, Ortner, & Schmitt, 2010; Dohmen et al., 2011; 
Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). Similarly, psychologists explore risk-taking propensity’s relations 
with behaviors like reckless driving, unhealthy habits, and criminality (Arnett, 1991; Gullone, 
Moore, Moss, & Boyd, 2000; Szrek, Chao, Ramlagan, Peltzer, 2012). More general social 
nonconformity, unethical behaviors, aggression, and self-harm are also associated with risk-
taking propensity (Sadeh & Baskin-Sommers, 2016; Weber, Blais, & Betz, 2002). 
Despite the widespread interest in and practical importance of risk-taking behaviors, there 
is substantial disagreement about theoretical conceptualizations and the appropriate measurement 
of risk-taking propensity. This study will examine the construct and criterion-related validity of 
scores produced by one widely used measure of risk-taking propensity: the Domain Specific 
Risk-Taking Scale (DOSPERT). The structure of the DOSPERT, its relation to other risk-taking 
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measures, and its utility in predicting risk-taking behaviors will be analyzed. This study will 
highlight DOSPERT scores’ unique relations with concrete outcomes, after accounting for 
similar measures, and the inclusion of alternative risk-taking propensity measures will elucidate 
possible shortcomings of the DOSPERT structure or content. In the following section, I will 
briefly introduce theoretical and measurement approaches germane to examinations of the 
DOSPERT against alternative measures. 
Theoretical Conceptualizations of Risk-Taking Propensity  
Risk-taking propensity has been conceptualized in three distinct theoretical ways: a) as a 
stable trait, b) as a domain-specific evaluation, c) as a descriptive versus normative decision-
making process. 
The Trait Approach. Early developments of the risk-taking propensity construct focused 
on trait-like tendencies: sensation seeking, impulsiveness, and venturesomeness (Eysenck & 
Eysenck, 1978; Zuckerman, Eysenck, & Eysenck, 1978). These constructs describe risk-taking 
propensity as a set of behaviors that reflect habitual dispositions to approach or avoid risk-related 
decisions (Knowles, Cutter, Walsh, & Casey, 1974; Yechiam & Ert, 2011). If risk-taking 
propensity is a trait, levels of risk-taking propensity will be reflected by a desire for greater 
frequency and intensity of risky situations (DeYoung, 2010). Sensation seeking captures 
information about people who take risks frequently rather than those who engage in the same 
activities infrequently (Desrichard & Denarié, 2005). Individual differences in risk-taking 
propensity also reflect differences in the need for novel, complex, intense, or varied situations 
(Arnett, 1994; Lauriola & Levin, 2001). Prior research on the temporal stability and rank-order 
consistency of risk-taking propensity and between-person neurobiological differences are also 
broadly supportive of the trait conceptualization.  
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For example, risk-taking “acceptance,” considered broadly as attitudes toward risk 
compared to certainty, has been shown to be stable over time (Yechiam & Ert, 2011). Risk-
taking propensity has also displayed rank-order stability similar to major personality facets: risk-
seeking peeks in late adolescence and declines with age (Josef et al., 2016). The motivations for 
risk-taking propensity should also be expected to be consistent over time. The need for thrills or 
the aversion to boredom that characterize sensation-seeking are rehearsed evaluations of 
particular situations, and these evaluations become habitual (Zuckerman & Kuhlman, 2000). 
Low need for cognition or low systematic processing of uncertain and unfavorable outcomes 
should also be considered habitual until a strong negative outcome forces re-evaluation of a 
similar situation in the future.   
Risk-taking propensity is also associated with neurobiological differences (Zuckerman & 
Kuhlman, 2000). The interaction of genes and shared environment explain, more than genes 
alone, tendencies to engage in risk-relevant behaviors like seatbelt use, birth control use, or 
riding a motorcycle (Miles et al., 2001). The stability of risk-taking propensity as a habitual set 
of behaviors supports conceptualizations of sensation seeking, impulsiveness, and 
venturesomeness as traits.  
Domain-specific evaluation. Trait conceptualizations of risk-taking propensity have been 
questioned due to evidence for cross-situational instability of risk-related behavior. Individuals 
who are highly risk-averse in some domains seek out risk in other domains (e.g., “insurance-
buying gamblers” and “skydiving wallflowers;” Johnson, Wilke, & Weber, 2004). This may, in 
part, reflect differences in how individuals evaluate the riskiness of activities (Althaus, 2005; 
Aven & Renn, 2009; Johnson et al., 2004; Weber et al., 2002). Risk-taking propensity may 
therefore be better understood as a series of positively or negatively valenced associations, which 
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can be less stable over time and across domains. For example, an individual may be very 
comfortable with financial risk but have a deep fear of being disliked by others. Later in life, that 
same individual may have financial obligations (e.g., children) that make him or her far less 
willing to engage in financially risk activities but also make him or her less concerned about the 
perceptions of others.  
These differences in willingness to engage in a risk-related activity can be understood 
through Vroom’s expectancy theory of motivation (Vroom, 1964). The motivation to engage in 
or avoid a certain action is a multiplicative function of valence, instrumentality, and expectancy 
(Landy & Becker, 1989). In considering risk-related decisions, valence and expectancy are the 
key drivers of individual differences. Difference in expectancy of a risk-related behavior is a 
difference in estimation of the likelihood that a negative outcome will occur. Numerically, 
expectancy ranges from 0, the estimation that a negative outcome is impossible, to 1, the 
estimation that a negative outcome is certain (Lunenburg, 2011). Valence refers to a person’s 
preference for a certain outcome of a risk-related behavior. Numerically, valence ranges from -1 
(extremely negative) to 1 (extremely positive); 0 indicating indifference to the outcome 
(Lunenburg, 2011). For the “skydiving wallflower,” social embarrassment is too intensely 
negative, but skydiving is not perceived as a high-risk activity, perhaps due to high perceived-
controllability (Johnson et al., 2004). This person may also have a low expectancy of the 
negative outcomes of skydiving, and high expectancy of negative social outcomes. This 
combination of valance and expectancy makes this person likely to engage in a recreational risk-
taking behavior, but avoid a social risk-taking behavior.   
 Concepts of risk-taking propensity as multidimensional, reflecting differences across 
domains, emphasize individual differences in the perception of riskiness and the perceived 
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importance of positive and negative outcomes in different domains. Measures developed out of 
this theoretical framework emphasize the influence of domains and situations on risk-taking 
behavior. 
Descriptive versus normative construct. The first two conceptualizations consider risk-
taking propensity a reflection of the tendency to engage in behaviors in which the probabilities of 
outcomes and even the outcomes themselves are unknown. However, in behavioral economics, 
risk-taking propensity generally describes “decisions made under risk,” meaning the respondent 
knows the possible positive and negative outcomes, and their exact probabilities (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1981; Weber, 2010; Weber, Blais, & Betz, 2002). Unlike trait and domain-specific 
propensity approaches, this field is primarily interested in financial behavior. Empirical tests 
with real, non-trivial, monetary consequences are considered optimal measures of risk-taking 
propensity by behavioral economists.  
This field also distinguishes between normative models and descriptive models of 
decision-making. Normative models assume rational, consistent principles guide behavior, 
whereas descriptive models like prospect theory empirically explore how individuals deviate 
from normative expectations (Zaleskiewicz, 2001). Normative models require multiplying the 
outcome of an action with its probability and subtracting this value from the cost, and the 
“correct answer” in a normative value equation is indicated by a positive solution. For example, 
a $1 lottery ticket with only one $1,000,000 winner should only be purchased if fewer than 
999,999 other people are participating ($1 – 1/999,999 * $1,000,000 = .000001). Measures like 
the Iowa Gambling Task and the Balloon Analogue Risk Task are descriptive instruments with 
normative responses in mind. The Iowa Gambling Task has been used as a clinical instrument to 
capture decision-making impairment (Upton, Bishara, Ahn, & Stout, 2011), and it was originally 
6 	
validated with a sample of patients with damage to the prefrontal cortex (Bechara, Damasio, 
Damasio, & Anderson, 1994). Tasks derivative of the Iowa Gambling Task do not require 
clinical samples to be considered normative measures. Descriptive measures involve a different 
interpretation of similar tasks. Descriptive models empirically explore how individuals deviate 
from normative expectations by taking decision-making biases, error, and the relative utility of 
money into account (Weber, 2010; Zaleskiewicz, 2001). All tasks involving money or other 
easily quantified outcomes based on clear probabilities can be interpreted through both 
descriptive and normative models. The “rational” response can be calculated, and quantified 
deviations from this ideal set of responses can be interpreted in a descriptive model.  
When risk-taking propensity is used as a label for differences in deviation from a norm, 
this approach can be treated as similar to trait conceptualizations. A “risk premium” or “risk 
perception” term within an expected utility calculation is an assumed, “typically…stable 
construct, i.e. a personality trait” (Weber & Johnson, 2009, p. 139). However, nothing about the 
normative vs. descriptive approach or an expected utility calculation necessitates a term 
accounting for differences only due to traits. Trait or relatively stable domain-specific 
differences may be parts of the risk-taking propensity difference term in these models, but not all 
apparent risk-taking behavior may be due to a “risk attitude” term (Weber & Johnson, 2009). In 
this way, a normative vs. descriptive approach may be broader in its identification of individual 
differences in risk-taking propensity, but measures derived from this approach are expected to 
converge partially with both trait and domain-specific measures.  
Approaches to the Measurement of Risk-Taking Propensity 
 These three broad theoretical ways of conceptualizing risk-taking propensity are also 
reflected in three broad ways in which risk-taking propensity is operationalized and measured. 
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Risk-taking propensity has been measured primarily in the following ways: a) trait self-report 
inventories b) domain-specific evaluations c) decision-making proxy tasks involving 
hypothetical money and d) decision-making proxy tasks involving real money.  
The majority of risk-taking propensity measures rely on self-reports. Self-report measures 
result in scores that have been shown to be predictive of concrete risk-related behaviors like 
counterproductive workplace behaviors, unhealthy habits, unsafe sexual practices, and reckless 
driving (Renner & Anderle, 2000; Van Iddekinge, Roth, Raymark, & Odle-Dusseau, 2012; 
Zuckerman, 2007).  
Self-report measures either assess a single global risk-taking propensity facet (e.g., 
Arnett, 1994), or assess risk-taking propensity in different domains. Broadly, risk-taking 
propensity trait self-report inventories separate the construct into sensation-seeking (or 
“venturesomeness”) and impulsiveness facets. Sensation-seeking refers to willingness to risk 
negative outcomes in pursuit of a new, complex, or intense experiences, and impulsiveness is 
conceptualized as the tendency to rapidly respond to cues for potential rewards without 
considering possible negative consequences (Zuckerman & Kuhlman, 2000). These two 
tendencies are not mutually exclusive (e.g. new experiences may be perceived as so rewarding, a 
person seeks them impulsively), and together they describe different motivations habitually 
approaching or avoiding risk-related decisions.  
One of the most widely used domain-specific assessment of risk-taking propensity is 
Weber and colleagues’ (2002) Domain Specific Risk Taking (DOSPERT) scale that examines 
five domains of risk-taking: a) health & safety, b) financial, c) recreational, d) ethical, and e) 
social. Other domains have been suggested to expand the DOSPERT: driving, occupational risk-
taking (entrepreneurship or changing careers often), self-harm (including suicidal ideation and 
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attempt), or aggression (Josef et al., 2016; Nicholson, Soane, Fenton-O’Creevy, & Willman, 
2005; Sadeh & Baskin-Sommers, 2016), but the DOSPERT five-domain framework is the most 
widely used among these measures.  
The DOSPERT was developed by reviewing concurrent literature and existing risk-taking 
measures capturing a wide variety of domains encountered by young adults in Western cultures 
(Weber et al., 2002). The original DOSPERT scale was developed, from an initial set of 101 
items, by selecting 10 items per domain with the highest item-total correlations to their own 
subscale, and the scale was reduced to the final 40-item original scale using ordinary least-
squares exploratory factor analyses (Weber et al., 2002). Certain items were revised to be more 
culturally generalizable (e.g. “Disagreeing with your father…” was revised to “Disagreeing with 
an authority figure…”), and the scale was shortened to 30 items by conducting exploratory and 
confirmatory factor analyses on random halves of a novel sample (Blais & Weber, 2006). 
Though the original 40-item DOSPERT consisted of six factors (ethical, social, health/safety, 
recreational, gambling, and investment), the short DOSPERT scale consists of five, by merging 
investment and gambling into the “financial” domain (Blais & Weber, 2006).    
Despite the popularity of self-report inventories, some have argued that scores on self-
report measures lack validity unless participants are performing objective tasks incentivized with 
real money for appropriately high stakes (Dislich et al., 2010; Holt & Laury, 2002; Lejuez et al., 
2002). These researchers have argued that responses to survey items are limited in their 
predictive validity and construct validity because survey questions are not “incentive 
compatible,” i.e. linked to any tangible gain or loss (Dohmen et al., 2011). Additionally, there is 
concern that self-report risk measures cannot predict self-reported socially undesirable behaviors 
(Sackett, Burris, & Callahan, 1989).  
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 The alternatives to self-report questionnaires are decision-making proxy tasks, meant to 
capture the characteristics of real-world risk-related decisions. Tasks like the Iowa Gambling 
Task and Balloon Analogue Risk Taking (BART) task vary in form but share key components: 
forcing approximation of future outcomes, capturing the expectancy of outcomes, and capturing 
aversion to loss (Bechara, 1994; Lejuez et al., 2002). Participants in these proxy tasks act in a 
simple game environment in which they can choose between options with uncertain outcomes. 
Participants can respond differently to the experience of a negative outcome (losing money) by 
choosing conservative or reckless options in future rounds. Decision-making tasks appear to 
reflect components of risk-related traits like sensation seeking and impulsiveness, and there is 
evidence for decision-making tasks as an appropriate measure of risk-taking preference as 
conceptualized by risk-related personality constructs (Lauriola et al., 2014; Mishra & Lalumière, 
2011; Upton et al., 2011). Scores on these proxy tasks and self-report questionnaires of risk-
taking propensity have been observed to be only modestly correlated (Lauriola et al., 2014; 
MacCrimmon & Wehrung, 1985; Mishra & Lalumière, 2011; Skeel, Neudecker, Pilarski, Pytlak, 
2007; Szrek et al., 2012).  
While decision-making proxy tasks are more objective than self-report measures of risk 
behavior, they are not without limitations. Specifically, the validity of responses to decision-
making proxy tasks with monetary incentives are likely to be influenced by both the 
characteristics of the specific task (e.g., the interestingness of the task, the degree of attention 
required; see Camerer & Hogarth, 1999), and the characteristics of the participant (e.g., mental 
arithmetic skills). Importantly, most decision-making proxy tasks are difficult to interpret when 
there is large variability in individual wealth in the sample, i.e. large differences in the relative 
utility of the task’s payout. 
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These limitations of decision-making proxy tasks suggest that many researchers who are 
interested in risk-taking propensity will continue to rely on self-report measures. It is the goal of 
this study to examine the validity of scores on the most widely used domain-specific assessment 
of risk-taking propensity, the DOSPERT Scale (Blais & Weber, 2006). Specifically, I aim to 
examine: a) the validity of the hypothesized five-factor structure of scores on the DOSPERT b) 
the convergent and discriminant validity of scores on the DOSPERT domains vis a vis scores on 
measures that operationalize risk-taking differently, c) the criterion validity of DOSPERT scores 
with respect to risky behaviors, and d) the incremental validity of DOSPERT scores over and 
above scores on other measures of risk-taking propensity for the prediction of risky behaviors.  
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CHAPTER 2 
METHOD 
 
Subjects 
Data were collected from 399 participants. Participants were recruited through the subject 
pool of a large, public Midwestern land-grant institution, and received 2 course credits as 
compensation. Three participants were excluded for excessive missing data (> 15% 
missingness). An additional 13 participants were excluded for failing 2 of 3 attention checks 
(final N = 383). Participants were permitted one failed attention check because stricter exclusion 
thresholds often screen data that is not indicative of random or careless responding (Kim et al., 
2017) The sample was primarily female (57.1%) and Caucasian (76%). Participants’ age ranged 
from 18 to 26, mean being 19.08.   
Measures 
Eysenck & Eysenck Impulsiveness/Venturesomeness  
The Impulsiveness scale consists of 19 items reflecting quick decision-making without 
considering or perceiving risks. Sample items of the Impulsiveness scale include “Do you 
usually make up your mind quickly?” and “Do you mostly speak before thinking things out?” 
(Eysenck, Pearson, Easting, & Allsopp, 1985). The Venturesomeness scale is a 16-item scale 
capturing decisions made while being aware of risks but acting anyway. The Venturesomeness 
scale includes items like “Would you like to learn to fly an airplane?” and “Would you enjoy fast 
driving?”. Because both scales were developed in the United Kingdom, mild revisions were 
made to replace terms and phrases uncommon in American English. For example, “to go pot-
holing” has been revised as “to explore a cave.”   
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Sensation Seeking Scale-Form V  
The Sensation Seeking Scale-Form V is a 40-item forced choice scale reflecting 
preference for novel and exciting experiences. For example, the sensation-seeking attitude “the 
worst social sin is to be a bore” is compared to “the worst social sin is to be rude.” Though 
developed initially for clinical populations, the Sensation Seeking Scale was revised to be 
generalizable to typical adult samples, and the resulting SSS-V encompasses four factors of 
sensation seeking behavior (Zuckerman et al., 1978). Thrill and Adventure Seeking captures 
desires to engage in extreme sports or dangerous recreational activities. Experience Seeking 
reflects desire for new sensory experiences through travel and other aspects of a “non-
conforming lifestyle.” Disinhibition represents the desire for social and sexual freedom. 
Boredom Susceptibility captures distaste for routine and tedium.   
The Impulsiveness/Venturesomeness and SSS-V scale were revised from forced-choice 
format to a 5-point Likert scale response. This revision facilitates the use of factor analytic 
techniques based on maximum likelihood estimation. Dichotomously scored items violate 
maximum likelihood estimations’ assumption of multivariate normality and distort the 
correlation matrices by which factor analyses are conducted (Reise, Waller, & Comrey, 2000). 
This revision also eliminates the possibility of artificially low correlations between forced choice 
format scales and Likert response scales in used by most other measures in the study.   
Arnett Inventory of Sensation Seeking  
The 20-item Arnett Inventory of Sensation Seeking is similar to the SSS-V, though it 
uses preference for novelty and intensity of situations as theoretical components of the latent risk 
trait (Arnett, 1994). Items like “I would like to travel to places that are strange and far away” 
capture novelty. Intensity items include “When I listen to music, I like it to be loud.” Participants 
13 	
rate each item using a 4-point Likert-type scale, ranging from describes me very well to does not 
describe me at all.  
Domain Specific Risk Taking Scale 
The 30-item Domain Specific Risk-Taking Scale (DOSPERT) is intended to assess five 
domains of propensity to favor risk (Blais & Weber, 2006). Participants assess their “likelihood 
of engaging in each activity or behavior if [they] were to find [themselves] in that situation” 
using a 7-point Likert-type scale, ranging from extremely unlikely to extremely likely. Items 
assess domains of Health & Safety, Ethical, Financial, Social, and Recreational risk. 
Representative items of those domains include, respectively: “Riding a motorcycle without a 
helmet,” “Passing off someone else’s work as your own,” “Betting a day’s income on the 
outcome of a sporting event,” “Disagreeing with an authority figure on a major issue,” and 
“Taking a skydiving class.”   
The scale was validated originally by comparing participants’ likelihood of engaging in 
40 activities to their ratings of how risky each activity seems, as well as their scores on 
Zuckerman’s Sensation Seeking Scale (Weber et al., 2002).  The original DOSPERT was revised 
in order to be more applicable to diverse adult populations and to shorten the scale to 30 items 
(Blais & Weber, 2006).   
Iowa Gambling Task 
Participants in the Iowa Gambling Task draw “loss cards” and “gain cards” with the goal 
of earning as much money as possible. The task involves four different decks, and participants 
are told a specific number of cards they must draw. Participants choose which decks they would 
like to draw from. Two decks have large gains and large losses. The other two have a smaller 
range of losses and gains. Playing the smaller range decks will lead to an overall gain, but 
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playing the “more extreme” decks will lead to an overall loss. Risk-seeking people tend to draw 
more from the more extreme decks because the “prospect of delayed punishment is outweighed 
by that of immediate gain” (Bechera et al., 1994).  
Columbia Card Task  
The Columbia Card Task is a risk-taking behavioral-proxy card game. Like other 
gambling tasks, the object is to maximize profit. Participants are presented 32 cards. Some cards 
denote gains, and some losses. Information about the number of “loss cards” in a deck, the range 
of amounts earned for drawing a “gain card”, and the range of amounts deducted from the bank 
for drawing a “loss card” are all explicitly stated. For each trial, participants choose the number 
of cards they would like to draw, then draw that number of cards all at once. Risk-averse people 
are more likely to choose fewer cards, because they recognize the fewer cards draw, the fewer 
opportunities for loss (Figner, Mackinlay, Wilkening, & Weber, 2009). 
Balloon Analogue Risk Task  
The Balloon Analogue Risk Task (BART) is a computer simulation designed to reflect 
real-world situations where riskiness pays off up to a breaking point where further action incurs 
losses (Lejuez et al., 2002). During the task, participants are asked to inflate a virtual balloon or 
stop to collect their winnings. Participants receive a small amount of money for every pump, but 
if the balloon pops, participants lose the money they accumulated for that balloon. The 
“capacity” of each balloon is decided by chance, and the probability of popping the balloon 
increases with each successive pump (e.g. the balloon has a 1/30 probability of popping on pump 
1, 1/29 probability of popping on pump 2, etc.). Participants can see the amount of money 
accumulated in a “bank” on screen. Participants more comfortable with risk will continue 
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pumping a given balloon, weighing the potential to win more money as more attractive than the 
potential to lose the money already earned in the trial (Lujeuz et al., 2003).  
Risky, Impulsive, and Self-Destructive Behavior Questionnaire  
The Risky, Impulsive, and Self-Destructive Behavior Questionnaire (RISQ) measures 
risky behaviors in the domains of drug use, aggression, gambling, sexual behavior, alcohol use, 
self-harm, impulsive eating, and general reckless behaviors (Sadeh & Baskin-Sommers, 2016). 
The RISQ asks participants to report for each risky behavior: 1) how many times they have 
engaged in the behavior in their life 2) how many times they have engaged in it recently 3) how 
old they were the first time 4) whether the behavior caused legal, social, or serious health 
problems 5) how much the behavior relieves stress and 6) how much the behavior is thrilling.  
For the purposes of this study, the total number of times a participant has engaged in a behavior 
(1) was treated as the primary indicator of risky behavior. For ethical reasons, suicidal self-harm 
questions were excluded as well as items describing assaults and threats made with a deadly 
weapon.  
Attention check items  
Three attention check items were included to screen for random responding. All three 
were of instructional manipulation check style, for example “If you believe you are paying 
attention to this survey, please select ‘describes me very well.’” Passing an attention check was 
scored as simply selecting the instructed response item.   
Procedure 
Participants were randomly assigned to six different versions of the survey. These 
versions differed only in the order in which the measures were presented. Measures were 
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grouped into six "blocks" which were randomized according to a Latin Square design. The 
survey materials were administered via Qualtrics.  
The decision-making tasks were administered at the same computer, but run through 
Inquisit. The Qualtrics survey was interspersed, according to the randomization design, with 
pages prompting the participant to let the research assistant open the Inquisit tasks. Before the 
start of the study, one of the three tasks was randomly chosen to count for real cash payout 
according to the "bank" amount they accrued during that task. Participants were told explicitly 
before the start of the randomly assigned cash task that their responses counted for real money. 
The tasks were designed to pay an average of $5, with possible payments ranging from $1 to 
$10.   
After completing the decision-making tasks and the other risk-taking measures, 
participants completed a social desirability measure and a demographics questionnaire. Finally, 
participants received their cash payment and were dismissed.  
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CHAPTER 3 
RESULTS 
DOSPERT Structure 
  Confirmatory factor analyses were conducted to explore the structure of the DOSPERT. 
Fit and modification statistics were calculated through Mplus using robust maximum likelihood 
estimation. Fit indices for all four models are provided in Table 1. The five-factor model 
assumed by the DOSPERT does not fit the data well (χ² = 1030.94, df = 395, CFI = .74, RSMEA 
= .07). An examination of the modification indices and residuals suggested that the financial risk 
taking items should be split into two factors: investment (e.g. “Investing 10% of your annual 
income in a new business venture”) and gambling (e.g. “Betting a day's income on the outcome 
of a sporting event”).  
This alternative six-factor solution fits the data better than the five-factor solution (χ² = 
821.14, df = 390, CFI = .82, RMSEA = .05). Comparisons between non-nested models can be 
made by calculating differences in the Bayesean Information Criterion (BIC), with differences 
greater than six indicating better fit by the model with the smaller BIC (Credé & Harms, 2015; 
Rafferty, 1995). Using this statistic, the six-factor model displays better fit than the DOSPERT’s 
assumed five-factor model (ΔBIC = 193.60).  
Two additional models were tested to explore the possibility of a higher-order factor 
structure, reflecting a “general risk-taking” construct. The hierarchical model consisted of six 
factors loading on one higher-order general factor. This fit of this model is similar to the six 
factor solution (χ² = 880.46, df = 399, CFI = .80, RMSEA = .06). Because the chi-square value 
calculated by maximum likelihood cannot be used to compute a chi-square difference without 
accounting for the scaling correction factor, the difference between the hierarchical model and 
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the nested six-factor model were calculated using the Satorra & Bentler (2010) scaled chi-square 
difference statistic. This difference test indicates that the hierarchical model is displays 
significantly worse fit than the six-factor solution (Δχ² = 59.83, df = 9). A bi-factor model was 
tested as an alternative higher-order to the hierarchical model. The bi-factor solution describes a 
structure in which a general factor exists, but is not formed by the six factors. A bi-factor model 
is a common higher-order alternative to a hierarchical model (Rindskopf & Rose, 1988). The fit 
a bi-factor model, is notably worse than the hierarchical model (χ² = 1064.36, df = 382, CFI = 
.72, RMSEA = .07). The difference in BIC confirms the better fit of the hierarchical model 
relative to the bi-factor solution (ΔBIC = 281.04). No calculated model meets cutoff criteria for 
acceptable fit: CFI and TLI > .95, RMSEA< .05 (Hu & Benlter, 1999).  
In these analyses, RMSEA and SRMR indices are more indicative of good fit than CFI or 
TLI. RMSEA and SRMR reflect the difference between the observed and predicted covariance 
and correlation matrices, respectively, whereas CFI and TLI reflect the difference between the 
examined model and the null model, in which no components are related (Cook, Kallen, & 
Amtmann, 2009). It is possible that random responding, which resembles uniform distribution of 
variables that are uncorrelated, has artificially decreased the fit as estimated by CFI and TLI.  
Low estimates of fit may also have been a product of the estimation method used in 
Mplus. Robust maximum likelihood estimation may not have been adequate to address severity 
of multivariate normality violation in the sample. The distribution of DOSPERT scores is clearly 
not multivariate normal (Henze-Zirkler = 1.50, p < .001), so analyses were rerun in LISREL to 
compare results derived from an asymptotic distribution free estimator. Fit indices calculated 
through LISREL are reported in Table 2. Fit improves with this estimation method. The six-
factor solution (χ² = 861.34, df = 390, CFI = .91, RMSEA = .06) appears to fit the data better 
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than the five-factor solution (χ² = 1128.39, df = 395, CFI = .85, RMSEA = .07). The improved 
fit of both the hierarchical model (χ² = 942.31, df = 399, CFI = .89, RMSEA = .06) and the bi-
factor model (χ² = 803.14, df = 375, CFI = .91, RMSEA = .05) suggests there is support for both 
a general risk-taking propensity factor and a six-factor solution.  
Because no model tested through confirmatory factor analysis met thresholds of 
acceptable fit, an exploratory factor analysis was conducted to explore a less constrained, but still 
plausible structure of the DOSPERT. The exploratory factor analysis was calculated with Mplus 
using maximum likelihood estimation and an oblique rotation allowing correlation between 
factors. A parallel analysis was conducted to compare the eigenvalues of the observed matrix to 
those derived from 100 iterations of random data with the same sample size and number of 
variables. Six factors were retained (observed eigenvalue = 1.29; average parallel eigenvalue = 
1.28) because the retention of seven factors (observed eigenvalue = 1.16; average parallel 
eigenvalue = 1.25) produces factors formed due to sampling error (Hayton, Allen, & Scarpello, 
2004). The six-factor solution does not fit the data according to Hu & Bentler’s (1999) criteria, 
(χ² = 517.57, df = 270, CFI = .91, TLI = .85, RMSEA = .05, SRMR = .04). Factor loadings are 
presented in Table 3.  
Factor 1 appears to capture gambling, as all three DOSPERT gambling items load 
strongly on this factor. Factor 2 appears to capture recreational risk-taking, as all DOSPERT 
recreational risk-taking items load on this factor. Factor 3 consists of the DOSPERT investment 
items and the ethical item describing risky tax deductions, so this factor seems to describe non-
gambling financial risk-taking. Factor 4 appears to capture ethical risk taking. All ethical items, 
as well as health/safety items with possible ethical components (e.g. drinking heavily, 
unprotected sex) load on this factor. Factor 5 appears to capture social risk taking, though only 
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four of six social items load on this factor. Factor 6 seems to capture information from 
DOSPERT items that is not described by any original DOSPERT domain. The strongest loadings 
on factor 6 are from the following items: “walking home alone at night in an unsafe area” 
“moving to a city far away from your extended family,” “starting a new career in your mid-
thirties” and “leaving your young children alone at home while running an errand.” The items 
making up factor 6 are ethical, health/safety, social, and recreational risk-taking activities. The 
common element in these items may be risk-taking behavior that results from a strong sense of 
independence and possible overestimation of self-efficacy. Communalities were calculated by 
subtracting the estimated residual variances from 1. Some item’s communalities are quite low 
(e.g. “admitting that your tastes are different from those of a friend” communality = .08; 
“sunbathing without sunscreen” communality = .12; “starting a new career in your mid-thirties” 
communality = .18), suggesting that the exploratory factor structure cannot account for a 
sufficient amount of variance in all DOSPERT items.  
Correlations between DOSPERT and non-domain specific measures 
Sensation-seeking was measured by two self-report inventories: the Arnett Sensation 
Seeking scale and the Sensation Seeking Scale – Form V. In this sample, correlations between 
the Arnett Sensation-Seeking scale and all other risk-taking measures are negative or near zero. 
These associations should not indicate that the Arnett Sensation-Seeking scale does not measure 
risk-taking or that sensation seeking is negatively associated with similar constructs. This scale 
uses a response format worded in the opposite direction of all other scales. It is probable that a 
non-trivial proportion of participants in this sample assumed the response format was in the same 
direction as others, or too few participants read the response options carefully. Because the 
Arnett scale format was potentially confusing, “sensation-seeking” in the following analyses 
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refers to the SSS-V scale. The Arnett scale correlations are included in the full correlation 
matrix, but not discussed in the following section. The full correlation matrix is displayed in 
Table 4.   
Internal consistency estimates for the DOSPERT domains social (α = .60), health and 
safety (α = .64), and ethical (α = .57) are inadequate using the standards proposed by Nunnally 
(1978) for even exploratory research. The low alpha reliabilities of scores on these scales are 
expected to attenuate the correlations involving these variables.  
DOSPERT domain intercorrelations range from r = .06 (social and gambling) to r = .47 
(recreation and health/safety). Correlations between general risk-taking propensity measures are 
stronger than intercorrelations among DOSPERT domains. Venturesomeness and sensation 
seeking are strongly related (r = .71). Impulsiveness correlates weakly with venturesomeness (r 
= .19) and moderately with sensation seeking (r = .32). These relations suggest venturesomeness 
and sensation-seeking overlap considerably, whereas impulsiveness is capturing related 
information about comfort with risk, but not in the same sense of taking risks for a thrill or in a 
pre-meditated situation (like seeking out new social experiences). Different motivations for risk-
taking behavior are reflected in these risk-taking propensity measures.  
The DOSPERT domains were compared to measures that assume a general risk-taking 
factor and do not differentiate between domains of risk-taking. Individual DOSPERT domains 
correlated significantly with global risk-taking measures. The strongest associations of domains 
and general risk-taking measures were between recreational risk-taking and venturesomeness (r 
= .77), recreational risk-taking and sensation-seeking (r = .67), health/safety and sensation-
seeking (r = .59), and health/safety and venturesomeness (r = .45). Overall, the correlations 
between the DOSPERT domains and general risk-taking scales are strongest when considering 
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venturesomeness/sensation-seeking, not impulsiveness. These relations indicate that the 
DOSPERT may be more descriptive of sensation-seeking motivations of risk-taking than more 
impulsive, reckless motivations.  
Correlations between DOSPERT and self-reported risk-taking behavior 
 Correlations between the DOSPERT domains and the RISQ domains were calculated to 
explore the connection between self-reported propensity and self-reported risk-taking behavior. 
Aggressive behaviors (RISQ Aggression) were weakly correlated with health/safety and ethical 
risk-taking. Gambling behaviors (RISQ Gamble) were correlated with gambling risk-propensity 
and investment risk-propensity. Risky sexual behaviors (RISQ SexBhv) were weakly correlated 
with social and recreational risk-taking. Recreational, gambling, health/safety, ethical, and social 
risk-taking propensity were significantly correlated with heavy alcohol use. Overall, the 
correlations observed between DOSPERT domains and the frequency of risky behaviors are 
weak. Risk-taking propensity may be weakly correlated with risk-related behaviors because other 
conditions that increase the likelihood in engaging in a risky activity are not measured in this 
study. The DOSPERT may be capturing information about a necessary-but-not sufficient 
condition for enacting a risky behavior. 
Correlations between DOSPERT and decision-making tasks 
 Hypothetical money. Correlations are generally weak between DOSPERT domains and 
decision-making tasks where the money earned is hypothetical. DOSPERT health and safety 
correlates with the total number of pumps in the BART task, and recreational risk-taking 
correlates with the number of popped balloons. No DOSPERT domain correlates significantly 
with the number of bad draws in the Iowa Gambling Task. Only social and health/safety risk 
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taking correlate with the number of draws in the Columbia Card Task. All other relations are 
weak or near-zero.  
 Cash. Similarly, correlations are weak between DOSPERT domains and decision-making 
tasks in which participants received real money. No DOSPERT domain correlates significantly 
with the total number of pumps in the BART task, the number of bad draws in the IGT, or CCT 
draws. However, the number of popped balloons in the BART correlates weakly with DOSPERT 
recreation, investment, and health/safety. The weak associations between the DOSPERT and 
risk-related behavior in a lab setting, even when cash incentives are present, indicate a lack of 
pertinent risk-taking information within the DOSPERT or a lack of decision-making tasks’ 
generalizability beyond specific behavioral economic paradigms.  
DOSPERT incremental validity 
 Two hierarchical regression analyses were conducted in order to examine the degree to 
which DOSPERT financial domain scores predict gambling behavior over and above scores on 
general risk-taking measures and decision-making tasks. In the first of these analyses, the 
number of BART balloon pops was regressed onto DOSPERT gambling and DOSPERT 
investment scores, after first controlling for global trait risk-taking measures. Because the BART 
task can be considered both a behavioral indicator of gambling behavior and a direct measure of 
risk-taking behavior, I also regressed RISQ gambling behaviors onto DOSPERT gambling and 
DOSPERT investment scores after first controlling for scores on the global trait risk-taking 
measures and the number of BART balloon pops.  
In the first model, DOSPERT gambling does not predict the number of balloons popped 
in the BART over and above DOSPERT investment, impulsiveness, venturesomeness, and 
sensation-seeking (ΔR² = .01, β = .12). DOSPERT investment does not account for a significant 
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amount of variance in BART pops after including DOSPERT gambling and global measures in 
the model either (ΔR² = .00, β = .05). Sensation-seeking scores are negatively associated with 
BART balloon pops in these analyses (β = -.25), which is not expected theoretically.  
In the second model, DOSPERT gambling accounts for variance in self-reported 
gambling after including BART balloon pops and impulsiveness in the model, (ΔR² = .06, β = 
.25). Similarly, BART balloon pops remain significant in accounting for variance in gambling in 
the model (β = .25). To test the additional variance explained by a global measure, the analysis 
was rerun with sensation seeking as the variable excluded from the model in step 1. Sensation 
seeking did not predict RISQ gambling scores above other variables in the model (ΔR² = .01, β = 
.17), including DOSPERT gambling (β = .25).  
In a separate set of regression analyses, I examined the extent to which all six DOSPERT 
domains might explain variance in risk-taking behavior, over and above general risk-taking 
measures. I regressed each of the seven RISQ subscales on all six DOSPERT domains, after 
controlling for impulsiveness, venturesomeness, and sensation-seeking. Full regression results 
are displayed in Table 5.  
The DOSPERT does not appear to explain additional variance in drug use, aggression, 
sexual behaviors, or general reckless behavior, after controlling for general risk-taking 
propensity measures. The strongest improvements made by the DOSPERT are in predicting 
heavy alcohol use and gambling self-reports. Similar to the first set of analyses, the DOSPERT 
gambling domain is significantly predictive of self-reported gambling frequency. More 
unexpectedly, variance heavy alcohol use is accounted for most by social and ethical risk-taking, 
not health & safety.  
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CHAPTER 4 
DISCUSSION 
The goal of this study was to explore the structure of the DOSPERT, its convergence 
with alternative risk-taking propensity measures, and its utility in predicting risk-taking behavior. 
In addressing the methodological differences between alternative risk-taking measures, this study 
has challenged certain theoretical assumptions. First, the assumed structure of the DOSPERT 
does not fit these data, though this finding was not expected prior to analysis. Other researchers 
have found that the financial domain fits better when split into investment and gambling, and 
these data support that modification to the DOSPERT (Highhouse et al., 2016). The original 
version of the DOSPERT included both investment and gambling domains, and it seems the 
shortened scale does not benefit structurally by combining the two (Weber et al., 2002). 
Investment and gambling may be conceptualized differently for a number of reasons. Investment 
and gambling are both domains in which gain and loss are uncertain, but investment is 
considered more socially acceptable than gambling. The “odds” of a favorable return on 
investment are generally greater than even the most favorable gambling odds. Investment 
portfolios are also handled by perceived experts, who are legally or ethically bound to invest in a 
client’s best interest. There are no “gambling experts” to hire on an individual’s behalf, and 
people perhaps view gambling as a different domain due to the lack of assistance offered by 
others, lack of perceived control in the outcome, and social undesirability.  
 In relation to global risk-taking traits, the DOSPERT seems to be more similar to 
venturesomeness than impulsiveness. The strength of these associations may be driven by the 
especially strong relations between recreational risk-taking, venturesomeness, and sensation-
seeking. These constructs are very similar. The DOSPERT has an advantage of capturing 
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sensation-seeking and venturesomeness information with fewer items, while potentially 
separating a person’s different expressions of sensation seeking through recreational activities or 
through disregarding safety in everyday settings. Also, the fit of the hierarchical and bi-factor 
structural models suggest that there is some support for a general risk-taking factor, potentially 
one that is expressed through the DOSPERT domains. This finding supports theories that 
“general risk-taking” is expressed through different underlying facets, and both general risk-
taking propensity and its domains can predict relevant outcomes (Skeel et al. 2007; Highhouse et 
al., 2016).   
 Between DOSPERT domains and self-reported risk-taking behavior, the correlations that 
are not significant are perhaps more informative than the significant relations. For example, 
DOSPERT health/safety ostensibly measures how likely a person may be to engage in risky 
health decisions. It was unexpected for the health/safety domain to be so weakly correlated with 
risky sexual behaviors and drug abuse, both of which have clear negative effects on health. 
Similarly, social risk-taking is unrelated to aggressive behaviors in this sample. Overall, 
correlations between DOSPERT domains and risk-taking behavior are quite low. These weak 
correlations may suggest a person’s assessment of his or her own risk-propensity is not an 
accurate approximation of the risky behaviors that person will engage in. These findings are 
perhaps moderated by individual differences in meta-cognitive ability, and estimations of one’s 
own ability to avoid a negative outcome can be substantially flawed (Jaccard, Dodge, Guilamo-
Ramos, 2005).   
 The theory that decision-making tasks are valid only when real money is at stake can be 
partially addressed by the difference found in correlations between the DOSPERT and decision-
making tasks when participants were paid. These data indicate that the BART task may be 
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capturing elements of premeditated risk-taking domains, like investment and recreation, when 
real money is at stake. The emergence of the BART number of explosions as the only measure 
correlated with any DOSPERT domain as two possible implications. The DOSPERT may be a 
generally imprecise predictor of real risk-taking behavior, or the BART may be the only 
decision-making task in this study that reflects specific domains of risk-taking assumed by the 
DOSPERT. Generally, the weak correlations found between DOSPERT domains and risky 
behaviors connected to tangible gain suggest a difference in the constructs being assessed by 
both measures. Risk-taking propensity measures are by no means interchangeable, and scores on 
different risk-taking measures appear to capture different elements of risk-taking.  
 Judging by the hierarchical regression analyses, DOSPERT domains show weak to 
moderate incremental validity in predicting self-reports of similar risk-taking behavioral 
frequency. The DOSPERT gambling domain is associated with reports of gambling behavior. 
However, the DOSPERT fails to account for variance in behavior when operationalized as 
behavior in a lab. Taken together, the DOSPERT domains are predictive of self-reported risk-
taking behaviors, after accounting for global risk-taking traits, primarily for heavy alcohol use 
and gambling. The lack of DOSPERT domains’ explanation of variance in other risk-taking 
behaviors may reflect an inappropriate balance in a fidelity-bandwidth trade-off. The DOSPERT 
may not be broad enough to capture underlying common elements to risk-taking, like impulsivity 
and sensation-seeking, but also not narrow enough to reflect specific risk-taking behaviors as 
measured by the RISQ. Considering the DOSPERT in this absolute context of narrow or broad 
scope may be inappropriate, however, because the most important element of the “trade-off” is 
matching the scope of the criterion to the scope of the measure (Hogan & Roberts, 1996). The 
DOSPERT may be appropriate in scope, if the risk-taking behavior of interest is neither 
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especially narrow (e.g. frequency of painkiller abuse) nor especially broad (e.g. “I engage in 
activities that are sometimes dangerous.”).  
Limitations 
 Because the factor analytic results do not meet acceptable thresholds of fit (Hu & Bentler, 
1999), model comparisons derived from the robust maximum likelihood estimation can only be 
made relative to each other. The unexpected poor fit of the five-factor solution assumed by the 
model drove a search for alternative structures, but improvements were only made in terms of 
degrees approaching an acceptable solution, not an acceptable solution itself. Exploratory 
analyses are needed to clarify a structure more indicative of true fit, rather than relying only on 
the asymptotic distribution free estimator results for all models.    
The statistical inferences made in this field are severely limited by low base rates of 
endorsement, producing non-normal, positively skewed distributions. Conventional 
transformations made to address non-normality (e.g. square root, inverse, natural log) are not 
adequate to address variables in which a non-negligible proportion of participants endorse the 
lowest value in a Likert scale, or indicate a frequency of 0. The low internal consistency 
estimates of the DOSPERT ethical, health/safety, and social domains are similarly statistically 
problematic. The low endorsement of items and low internal consistency of these domains may 
be partially explained the scale content. Consider two items in the health/safety domain: 
“Driving a car without a seatbelt” and “Drinking heavily at a social function.” Participants may 
indicate low likelihood (Skewness = .83) of not wearing a seatbelt, because of a perceived 
obvious, sudden, severely negative consequence, like injury or death in a car collision. When 
considering the health risk of heavy drinking, however, participants may respond differently 
(Skewness = -.15), perceiving the negative consequence from this activity as relatively distal, 
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gradual, and more easily treated (a hangover, mild liver dysfunction, etc.) than the consequences 
of a car collision. The inclusion of these two items with seemingly different associated 
expectancies and valence complicates statistical inferences drawn from their shared health/safety 
domain.  
Conclusion 
In general, there is a fundamental methodological problem indicated by the lack of 
convergence between DOSPERT domains, self-reported risk-taking behaviors, and decision-
making proxy tasks. These measures have different underlying theoretical assumptions and 
different operationalizations, yet they purport to measure the same construct. The five 
DOSPERT domains do not fit the data in this sample. A revision of the DOSPERT short scale 
may be warranted. Because the scale as currently administered consists of balanced factors (six 
items per domain), validation of a new scale should include three additional items for both the 
investment and gambling domains. These items may be drawn simply from the original scale, 
which separated investment and gambling (Weber et al., 2002).  The DOSPERT appears to 
display low convergent validity with alternative measures of risk-taking, low criterion validity in 
relation to risky behavior either as self-reported or a task in the lab, and low incremental validity 
in predicting risk-taking behavior over and above other measures. Overall, risk-taking propensity 
measures do not appear to converge, and risk researchers should consider what motivational 
components of risk-taking are being reflected by a measure and what measured outcome is 
relevant to those components.  
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TABLES 
Table 1. Confirmatory factor analyses testing alternative DOSPERT structures, Mplus fit estimates 
Model χ2 df RMSEA SRMR CFI TLI BIC 
Five-factor 1303.94 395 .07 .07 .74 .71 43211.66 
Six-factor 821.14 390 .05 .06 .82 .80 43018.06 
Hierarchical  880.46 399 .06 .07 .80 .78 43023.53 
Bi-factor 1064.36 382 .07 .16 .72 .68 43304.57 
 
Table 2. Confirmatory factor analyses testing alternative DOSPERT structures, LISREL fit estimates 
Model χ2 df RMSEA SRMR CFI TLI 
Five-factor 1128.39 395 .07 .07 .85 .84 
Six-factor 861.34 390 .06 .07 .91 .89 
Hierarchical  942.31 399 .06 .07 .89 .88 
Bi-factor 803.17 375 .05 .06 .91 .90 
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Table 5. Hierarchical regression results displaying the proportion of variance in risk-related behavior 
accounted for by all DOSPERT domains. 
 Dependent Variable: RISQ Subscale 
 Drug Use Aggression Gambling Sexual Behaviors 
 ΔR² β ΔR² β ΔR² β ΔR² β 
Step 1 .04  .04  .01  .02  
Control 
variablesa         
Step 2 .06  .05  .16**  .05  
Social  .13*  -.05  -.13*  .10 
Recreational  -.08  -.06  -.07  .07 
Invest   .05  .05  -.01  .03 
Gamble  -.08  .01  .36**  -.03 
Health/Safety  -.03  .06  -.03  -.02 
Ethical  .06  .07  .03  -.13* 
 Dependent Variable: RISQ Subscale 
 Alcohol Abuse Impulsive Eating Reckless Behavior  
 ΔR² β ΔR² β ΔR² β   
Step 1 .12  .02  .02    
Control 
variablesa         
Step 2 .17**  .07*  .05    
Social  .12*  .06  .10   
Recreational  .05  .09  -.06   
Invest   -.01  .09  .04   
Gamble  .03  -.11  .05   
Health/Safety  -.06  -.03  .06   
Ethical  .19**  .16**  .07   
Note: N = 383 
aControl variables = Impulsiveness, Venturesomeness, and the Sensation Seeking Scale-Form V. 
* p < .05. ** p < .01 
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